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Foreclosures In Ohio: Does Lender Type
Matter?
Introduction
As mortgage delinquencies and foreclosures grow across the nation and reports of allegedly-abusive lending practices abound in the popular media, the debate over who is responsible for the mess is heating up. National Consumer Law Center's Seniors
Initiative notes: 1
Deceptive lending practices, including those attributable to home improvement scams, are among the most frequent problems experienced by financially distressed elderly Americans seeking legal assistance. This is particularly true of minority homeowners who lack access to traditional banking services and rely disproportionately on finance companies and other less regulated lenders.
Moreover, a study by the Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University finds that higher-priced loans are more likely to originate from less-regulated lenders (i.e., mortgage lenders regulated by HUD) than from regulated-lenders (i.e., mortgage lenders regulated by the FED, OTS, OCC, FDIC or NCUA). 2 In the popular media, Ameriquest, Ameritrust, Franklin Financial and others have become poster boys for the aggressive lending practices in the mortgage market.
This paper examines the relationship between troubled mortgages and the level of regulation faced by the financial institutions lending in the market. Put differently, 2 does the way lenders are regulated matter for delinquency and foreclosure rates? The answer to the question will be a step toward answering more broad regulatory questions such as whether the problem is really the lack of regulation or whether the problem would go away if all mortgage lenders were regulated and supervised the same way.
Using the lenders' loan application register ( and the less-regulated lenders. I find that the foreclosure rate in a county increases significantly with increasing share of non-local banks and less-regulated lenders in originations. 3 Overall, there does not seem to be a statistically significant difference between the less-regulated lenders and their non-local regulated counterparts in terms of their impact on foreclosures.
Whether a lender has a physical presence in a market may matter for multiple reasons. First, local depository institutions may know their neighborhoods better than out-of-town lenders and less-regulated mortgage lenders because they constantly interact with consumers and businesses on both sides of their balance sheets by making loans and taking deposits. The information advantage, if there is one, is likely to show up in higher loan quality. Second, even in the absence of any informational advantage, local lenders may be less likely to foreclose on properties because of their ties to the community. The pressure from community groups, for example, may be a factor that affects a bank's decision to foreclose or to come up with a work-out plan.
There is a rich literature on the factors associated with mortgage delinquencies, and the final outcome post-delinquency (i.e., mortgage is cured, foreclosed, etc.; see the next section). The delinquency is modeled as a put option on the house, owned by the borrower. As suggested by the option pricing theory, the option is most valuable and delinquencies most frequent if, among other things, the house price volatility is high or the market value of the house is less than the money owed. The transition from 3 delinquency to foreclosure is less likely if, among other things, the loan-to-value ratio is low or the borrower's time on the job is high.
My approach to the problem is fundamentally different from the existing literature in two ways. First, the previous studies use individual loan data obtained from a single lender or from a pool of securitized mortgages and apply logistic regression to estimate the probability of various outcomes. This type of data does not allow the study of the impact financial market structure has on the loan performance, such as whether delinquencies and foreclosures are a function of lender type, because either there is only one originator or the originator information is absent in the data. To get at these issues I employ a different strategy and examine how the level and the rate of change of delinquencies and foreclosures in a market are related to the lagged-values of each type of lenders' market share. So, in lieu of loan-by-loan analysis that tracks the performance of individual loans, I concentrate on broad market trends.
Second, instead of focusing on loans originated throughout the country by a single lender, I focus on loans originated in a single State---Ohio---by all lenders.
Focusing on a single State allows me to divorce the discussion from State-specific factors, such as State regulation of mortgage brokers, judicial vs. non-judicial procedures for foreclosure, efficiency of the State judiciary, etc.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I will identify the variables that are relevant to the analysis. Section 3 describes the data sources and the econometric method. Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 concludes.
Factors Affecting Mortgage Performance
Home mortgage delinquencies are best analyzed within the context of contingent claims models. Delinquency is a put option on the collateral. As such, the observed frequency of delinquencies should depend on variables that affect the value of a put option; namely, asset price relative to exercise price, volatility, interest rate, expiration date, transaction costs and dividend yield Kau, Keenan, and Kim, 1994; Quigley and Van Order, 1995; Thomson, 1997, 1998) .
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Local economic factors such as unemployment and trigger events such as divorce may also force the exercise of the option even when it is not in the money.
Foreclosure is the second part of the two-step default process. Ambrose and Capone (1996) were first to recognize (analytically) that all delinquencies don't end up in foreclosure. After a delinquency, the subsequent process is more of a negotiation between the borrower and the lender than the lender simply using its right to seize the property. The borrower can prepay the loan, the lender may choose to forbear, restructure the loan, agree to a short-sale or foreclose.
The recognition of the existence of various resolution options led to a more detailed analysis of which factors determine the default probability and the final outcome after a delinquency (Ambrose, Buttimer and Capone, 1997; Ambrose and Buttimer, 2000) . Ambrose and Capone (1998) found that whether the final outcome will be a foreclosure strongly depends on the reason the mortgage became delinquent in the first place. If the borrower optimally exercised its put option because it was in the money, the mortgage will end up in foreclosure unless there is an event that changes the borrower's valuation of the option (ruthless default). If the borrower was involuntarily pushed into delinquency by a trigger event (divorce, unemployment, etc.), he will try to avoid the foreclosure if he can find an alternative source of funds. So, in predicting the incidence of foreclosures, it is important to account for both types of defaults by controlling for trigger events as well as factors that put the default option in the money.
Equity is one such factor that affects the value of the put option. The importance of the original and current loan-to-value ratio has long been recognized (Von Furstenberg, 1969; Campbell and Dietrich, 1983) . Greater levels of equity ownership (the loan amount---the strike price of the put option---falling behind home value) is associated with lower delinquencies and fewer foreclosed properties. A second factor that may be related to the borrower's equity position is the age of the mortgage; as the mortgage is paid off, the equity increases. Kim (1993, 1994) find that foreclosures are more likely with recently originated loans.
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Capozza, Kazarian, and Thomson (1998) study the effect of home price and interest rate volatility as well as the dividend (rental) yield on default. Their crucial finding is that the effects are highly nonlinear in the level of equity (loan-to-value---LTV---ratio). For example, at high levels of equity (low LTV), high house-price volatility has a positive impact on default probabilities. At low levels of equity (high LTV), high house-price volatility means that there is value in waiting to see if home prices will fall even further; so, the probability of default drops.
Transaction costs are the costs associated with the exercise of the default option, incurred by the borrower. For example, the damage to the borrower's creditworthiness may affect future employment opportunities and limit access to credit (Phillips and VanderHoff, 2004) .
Data and Method
The dependent variables of interest in this paper are foreclosures and delinquencies. The number of foreclosure filings in each county, in every year from 1999 to 2006 is reported in the Ohio Supreme Court's Ohio Courts Summary. Note that filings do not represent properties that were eventually foreclosed on; they represent the first legal step in a long process. Some of the troubled mortgages may eventually be cured but the filings are the only reliable foreclosure-related data reported at county level for all counties of Ohio. Furthermore, the fact that the mortgage has not been cured between the beginning of the delinquency and the filing date (at least 90 days)
indicates that these mortgages are in worse shape than other loans in the delinquency pool. Although a filing does not always end in actual foreclosure, it is still interesting to examine how the presence of these severely delinquent mortgages varies with the lender mix in the county. The foreclosure rate for county i at time t is F it , defined as the number of filings per owner-occupied housing units.
Obtaining total delinquencies, D it , is more problematic. Past-due mortgages are not publicly reported at county level. Therefore, as a proxy for the market delinquency rate, I will use the average mortgage delinquency rate of the regulated depositories lending in the county, weighted by the share of the county in their originations (see 6 Appendix A). Given that for many lenders, each Ohio county constitutes only a small fraction (less than 1%) of their total originations, those lenders that originate less than 1% of their loans in the county will get zero weight in the calculation to limit the noise.
Lenders' mortgage delinquency rates are reported in bank and thrift quarterly regulatory reports. Such a proxy comes with an obvious warning flag. The delinquency rate of the regulated institutions may be affected by the competition among them or the presence of less-regulated lenders. In that case, any relationship between the delinquency rate and the type of lender may be due to competition and not necessarily due to the regulatory environment the lender operates in. While I attempt to control for the level of competition in the market, such controls are never perfect and there will undoubtedly be some residual effects. The advantage of a dynamic panel over cross-sectional analysis is two-fold.
First, the Arellano-Bond first-differenced GMM estimator allows to control for unobserved county-specific effects. Second, the technique accounts for auto-regressive dynamics and allows for explanatory variables that are not strictly exogenous.
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The cross sectional regressions have their own advantages. First, they do not suffer from the potential bias in the dynamic panel that arises from the large number of instruments relative to the number of cross sections (more on this in the next section).
Second, my dataset contains the 2000 Census levels of some crucial demographic factors.
Because I cannot capture the time-variance in these factors, they automatically drop out of the dynamic panel. 4 So, the cross sectional analysis allows a richer control variable set.
Dynamic Panel Analysis
I begin the analysis by estimating the system below with the Arellano-Bond firstdifferenced GMM applied in two-stages: LRegD it , is calculated by adding up the dollar amounts instead of numbers. 5 It is often reported in the press, that frequent, costly refinancings are used to erode homeowners' equity in their houses. To distinguish between home purchase loans and refinancings, I create six new variables: Purch it is the number of home purchase loans originated in county i, year t per owner-occupied housing units.
PRegNL it , and PLReg it are the shares of regulated non-local lenders and less-regulated lenders, respectively. Similarly, Refi it is the total number of refinancings and RRegNL it , and RLReg it are the respective market shares of regulated non-local lenders and lessregulated lenders in the refinancing market. The market shares in dollars are denoted by adding a 'D' to the end of the variables' names.
Taking the first difference of (1) eliminates the unobserved, individual-specific, time-invariant effects, ξ i and η i .
( )
Note that the identification of ∆F it is a critical issue. In the remainder of this section, I will discuss the identification of ∆F it first. Then, I will examine the components of Χ it . Finally, I will discuss my assumptions about the workings of the mortgage market that lead to this particular model.
Identification
I identify ∆F it using two different techniques. The first one deals with the endogeneity of the lagged foreclosure rate, ∆F it-1 in (2b). This technique involves the use of lagged values of the right-hand side variables as instruments, which I treat as predetermined. In other words, 
The reasoning behind this assumption is that a rise in foreclosures in the current period may affect the characteristics of the local real estate market---e.g., home values, lending market competition, etc.---in the future (3b). However, the lags will be uncorrelated with ∆ν it (3a).
The second identification technique involves the use of an instrument, which is correlated with D it-1 but uncorrelated with the error term in the second stage, ν it . My choice for instrument is a variable correlated with the incidence of adjustable-rate mortgages (ARM) in the market, Arm it-2 . The rate-reset of ARMs has been associated with high delinquency rates. In a rising interest rate environment, loan payments resetting to a higher level may be associated with higher delinquencies. Alternatively, ARMs can be used as an affordability product that lowers interest costs in the short-run.
This latter effect may show up in lower delinquencies as long as home prices are growing and refinancings are available. Either way, once the loan is delinquent, whether it will be prepaid, restructured or foreclosed on does not depend on whether it has an adjustable rate or not; it depends on the borrower's ability to make timely payments in the future. In other words, after the delinquency, a lender would treat an ARM the same way it treats a fixed-rate mortgage.
In terms of data availability, HMDA does not contain information about whether a loan is fixed or adjustable rate. I create a county-level proxy for this variable by calculating the average share of ARMs in the mortgage holdings of the regulated financial institutions, where each institution is weighted by its mortgage market share in the county. This measure makes two important assumptions. First, I assume that the balance-sheet ARMs are representative of the total ARM production of the local depositories (including the securitized loans). The second and somewhat stronger assumption is that the ARM origination rate of regulated entities is highly correlated with the ARM origination rate of the less-regulated lenders. That is, the composition of the depositories' on-balance-sheet mortgage loan portfolios is representative of the market.
In estimating the first stage (2a), I treat ∆Arm t-2 and the other right-hand side variables as predetermined.
Valuing the Default Option at County Level
In this section, I take each component of the default-option valuation models described earlier, and identify their equivalent for county-level aggregate analysis
One of the critical variables in the contingent-claim models I described earlier is In earlier research that dealt with individual loans, borrowers' creditworthiness (i.e., the transaction cost of exercising the default option) has been measured by the applicants' credit score. I work with data aggregated to state level and I don't have the credit score data in the entire analysis period. Instead, I create a variable from HMDA based on lenders' reported rejection rates due to poor credit histories. More specifically, when a lender rejects an application, it has to give at least one and up to three reasons for the rejection (e.g. insufficient cash, high debt, mortgage insurance denied, etc). 7 One of these reasons is the borrower's credit history. I conjecture that the lower the credit scores are in a county, the greater is the likelihood of observing credit-history as a reason for loan denial. So, my credit quality variable, Denial, is the share of loans denied due to poor credit history among all loans denied. In fact, in 2003, the only year in which I have access to county median credit scores, the correlation between the median score and my denial variable derived from the 2003 HMDA is -40% (lower score is associated with higher rate of rejection due to poor credit history).
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An additional transaction cost is the non-pecuniary cost of losing one's home and leaving a familiar neighborhood. The more people are involved in or committed to their neighborhood, the less likely they are to consider mortgage default as an option in response to financial troubles. To capture people's involvement in their community, I
use the election turnout, Turnout. Ohio Secretary of State publishes the election turnout in each county in even-number years. I estimate a turnout for odd years by averaging the preceding and the subsequent turnout rate. The downside to using turnout is that it may not be a clean measure of community involvement as one would like; it is also possible that people will vote in large numbers in economically stressed areas to effectuate some change in their neighborhoods. While I expect a negative coefficient from the community involvement effect, the coefficient may turn positive if the economic effect dominates.
I cannot control for interest and house price volatility directly because highfrequency data are not available at county level. However, I can control for the volatility of the underlying local economy, which, I assume, will be correlated with the volatility of interest rates and home prices. My proxy for the volatility in the economy is the standard deviation of the monthly unemployment rates in each year, σUnempl. The data source is Ohio Job and Family Services.
In terms of trigger events, I control for the divorce rate, Divorce, in each county annually from 1997 to 2006 and the unemployment rate, Unempl, over the same period.
The divorce data comes from Ohio Department of Health. The unemployment rate is reported by the Ohio Job and Family Services.
Other Variables of Interest
While the contingent claims models are an attractive way of thinking about mortgage defaults, they entail some oversimplifications when it comes to thinking about the problem empirically. For example, racial composition of the neighborhood or competition among the lenders may affect the terms of the loan and the lending standards. Admittedly, lax standards, for example, would show up in the data as high 13 LTV ratios or low minimum credit scores. Still, controlling for race and competition separately provides a more colorful picture of the default process.
I measure the competition in the mortgage market, Herf, with a HerfindahlHirschman market-concentration index, calculated using the mortgage-market share of all the institutions lending in each county, irrespective of their regulatory status or branch presence in the market. The data source is HMDA.
The final control variable captures the incentive effect of previous loan restructurings on mortgage performance. More specifically, Lenient, is the ratio of restructured mortgage loans to the sum of Other Real Estate Owned (OREO) and restructured mortgage loans. As this ratio increases, future borrowers may expect a rescue after delinquency and become more likely to default. Alternatively, leniency may reduce the observed delinquencies in the short-run. The ratio is calculated using the weighted-average of individual regulated-lender ratios where the weight is the share of the county in the lender's total originations (once again, lenders are deleted if the county's share in their mortgage portfolio is less than 1 percent).
Timing of Events
A significant challenge that arises from the way I track defaults and explain them with the lender mix in earlier periods is determining when the effect of a change in the lender mix shows up in the data. The model I estimate in (2) makes two critical assumptions about the timing of events. The first one is that a foreclosure filing occurs in the year following the delinquency. In other words, F t is a function of D t-1 . This is a sensible assumption given that my delinquency measure is as of December 31 st and foreclosure proceedings are typically initiated when three or more mortgage payments are overdue. While a borrower with good credit can technically delay the proceedings for more than a year under a forbearance agreement, I expect these types of arrangements to be a relatively small fraction of delinquencies. The second implicit assumption is that the effect of lending by one particular type of financial institution will be observed in the delinquencies in the following year and in foreclosure filings in the year after that. 
Cross-Section Analysis
In this section, I examine how the market share of various types of lenders affect future delinquency and foreclosures by estimating the system below, separately in each year t from 1999 to 2006, using GMM to deal with potential heteroscedasticity.
( )
Χ it is the same vector of time-varying variables as in (1) that influence the value of the default option. As before, Arm it-2 is the instrument that identifies F it .
Valuing the Default Option at County Level: Data from the 2000 Census
CS i is a vector of time-invariant explanatory variables from the 2000 Census.
These are variables that affect the value of the default option, but were excluded from the panel analysis because they are eliminated by first-differencing.
One such variable is the standard measure of equity in a house, the LTV ratio.
Unfortunately, HMDA does not report the LTV ratios. As I already have a measure of home values, I will pick a proxy for the mortgage debt-load of homeowners and enter the two variables in the analysis separately. Compared to using an LTV ratio, my approach allows "loan" and "value" to have different coefficients in the analysis and is therefore less restrictive. The key is of course to find a proper substitute for the "loan" component. I use the median monthly owner-costs reported in the 2000 Census, which
gives me the approximate level of mortgage and property tax payments in the county.
Property tax payments are a function of home values which are already controlled for; so, the new variable mainly captures the effect of mortgage payments. Obviously, the mortgage payments are a flow measure while the debt levels that I am interested in are stock measures. Still, keeping interest rates constant (only to the extent described earlier), mortgage payments must be highly correlated with the debt levels. Therefore, I
use the natural log of the owner costs as a proxy for the debt level, Debt00.
The real-estate equivalent of the dividend yield is the rental yield. I use a priceto-rent ratio, Ptor00, to capture the rental yield. The components of the ratio are median home prices and gross rents for each county, which come from the 2000 Census.
I also add to the analysis some population characteristics that make trigger events more likely. Given the increasing job losses in manufacturing in Ohio, I expect the share of population employed in manufacturing, Manuf00, to be positively correlated with the likelihood of trigger events. Similarly, I expect people with low levels of educational attainment to have less stable jobs and therefore a greater chance of triggering a negative event. My measure of educational attainment, HSchool00, is the share of the adult population with a high school diploma or less. Finally, in order to determine the vulnerability of households if trigger events occur, I need some measure correlated with net worth. I choose the share of children living in single-parent households, ChildSP00, as such a measure. The presumption is that a single adult with children will be more vulnerable to economic shocks for at least two reasons. First, the income flow is likely to be less than that of a two-parent household and second, the parent may lose work hours because he or she is the only caregiver for the children when there is an illness in the family.
Other Variables of Interest
The log-population of the county, Population00, is intended to capture the availability of a variety of financial services in the county. I expect a more diverse group of lenders to be present in high-population counties because they are economic centers.
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The economic-center effect must be isolated before I can examine the effect of lender types on loan performance.
I add the race factor in the analysis by controlling for the share of AfricanAmericans in the total population, Black00. The data source is the 2000 Census.
Results
I begin the discussion of the results with an overview of some sample statistics and univariate relationships between the amount of lending, the market share of different types of lenders and the delinquency and foreclosure rates. That discussion is followed by an examination of the results from the dynamic panel analysis. A discussion of the cross-section analysis concludes this section.
Summary Statistics
The summary statistics of each variable discussed in Section 3 are presented in Table I . While the market share of regulated local lenders, RegL, is the omitted variable in the analysis, it is included in the summary statistics table. Table I County, the county with the lowest foreclosure rate, is also the county where the share of the regulated local lenders is the highest. Table II shows the simple correlations among the variables of primary interest.
Counties where there is a lot of mortgage lending per household are also the counties where the foreclosure rates are high. At the first glance, the correlations also confirm the press reports that the increased presence of less-regulated lenders is associated with increased foreclosures. While the presence of non-local regulated lenders is also positively correlated with foreclosures, this correlation is much weaker than the one with the less-regulated institutions. housing unit, the delinquency rates of local small lenders are significantly smaller a year down the road but the market-wide foreclosure rates are higher two years into the future. When interpreted together with the correlation results from Table II, the findings   of Table III The question then becomes why uninformed lenders would follow such a money-losing strategy, oblivious to adverse selection effects. One explanation is that they may be underestimating the importance of soft information in the mortgage market and depending heavily on mortgage brokers who seem to have neglected their due diligence in recent years according to press reports. Alternatively, these lenders may be attracted to the area in an attempt to make a quick buck while the market is rising. Their overconfidence in their ability to identify the peak of the market may lead to such behavior.
Univariate Analysis
Without proper controls, such conclusions are admittedly highly speculative. I cannot identify lenders' business strategies from the available data. Therefore, I turn to the multivariate results in the remainder of this paper.
Dynamic Panel Analysis
The results in Table IV -Panel A show that increased market share of non-local regulated mortgage lenders and less-regulated lenders at the expense of local lenders has no significant impact on delinquency rates of local lenders. Two crucial variables that drive delinquencies are income growth and the election turnout. Delinquencies are higher where income growth is slow and election turnout is high. The latter is consistent with the reaction-to-economic-stress story.
Table IV-Panel B shows that increased market share of non-local regulated mortgage lenders and less-regulated lenders at the expense of local lenders has a positive impact on foreclosure rates. One standard deviation increase in the total market share of non-local banks (13 percentage points), RegNL -2 , is associated with a 0.10 percentage points increase in the foreclosure rates. This is approximately equivalent to 8 percent of the mean foreclosure rate in the sample. A similar magnitude increase in the total market share of less-regulated lenders is associated with a similar magnitude increase in the foreclosure rate. Note that the effects are statistically indistinguishable.
The same result holds for mortgages taken for purchasing a house. The impact of lender type in the refinancing market is more muted. In this case, there is no significant relationship between the foreclosure rates and the market share of lessregulated and regulated-non-local lenders.
The panel also reveals a positive correlation, as expected, between the county unemployment rate and foreclosures. So, the health of the local economy is an important driver of foreclosure rates. The only other significant variable is home values.
Foreclosure rates tend to be higher in counties where home prices (natural log) were 19 high. One potential explanation is that the lender is more likely to sell the collateral and recover its loan in areas where home prices are high compared to areas where they are depressed. In depressed markets, a work-out may be to everyone's interest. The most striking observation is that in early years (2000) (2001) , there is a negative relationship between LReg it-2 and the delinquency rate, D t-1 . This is consistent with the discussion in Section 4.2 that arm's-length lenders may be attracting the riskier end of the borrower pool due to adverse selection (or by choice) and leaving the local lenders with safer loans. An interesting question is why the negative relationship disappears in later years. One speculative answer is that the local lenders may have lowered their lending standards in later years to keep up with competition.
Cross-Section Analysis
RegNL t-2 is significant and positive in the foreclosure regressions in six out of eight years. The interesting observation is that its effect becomes economically more significant in later years. One standard deviation increase in RegNL t-2 in 2004 is associated with a 0.14 percentage points increase in the foreclosures in 2006 (11 percent of the mean foreclosure rate). This observation may indicate that non-local regulated lenders are less likely to work with borrowers to avoid foreclosure because they have no stake in the community. Alternatively, they may be more realistic about the deteriorating conditions in the housing market and they may be more inclined to foreclose on the property to prevent it from falling into disrepair. Unfortunately, it is not possible to identify lenders' motives in this study.
Six variables enter the regressions with mostly significant results. First, foreclosure rates are higher in counties where there is more lending per household.
Second, Denial has a positive coefficient in the foreclosure regressions in five out of eight years, which is consistent with the idea that in areas where credit quality is low, lenders 20 are less likely to offer a work-out plan. Third, foreclosure rates tend to be low in counties where the price-to-rent ratio, Ptor00, is high (the effect is more muted for delinquencies). This observation suggests that if the price of a house is well above the fundamental value---keeping the price of the house constant---, troubles borrowers can sell their homes and walk away from their debts. Alternatively, the lender may have an incentive to delay the foreclosure since the local market is attractive and the house can be seized and sold in the future if the work-out plan is a failure. Consequently, the lender may be more willing to delay the foreclosure and offer a work-out plan. Fifth, educational attainment, HSchool00, is positive indicating that in counties where a larger fraction of the population has a high school diploma or less, foreclosure rates tend to be higher. Finally, the fraction of children living in single parent households, ChildSP00, is also positively associated with foreclosures suggesting that low net worth may be a factor behind high foreclosure rates.
The remaining variables are either not consistently significant or they switch 
Conclusion
The results suggest that the type of the financial institutions lending in a county is a factor that influences the foreclosure rates. Although the evidence is not consistently strong in every single time period, there are some indications that foreclosures tend to be lower in areas where local regulated-lenders are more active than others.
This observation does not constitute proof that those other lenders have followed predatory practices. As outsiders, they may have overestimated the growth potential of the market or depended upon third parties (brokers) who may have neglected their due diligence in order to generate volume and meet the demand. These are issues that must be addressed in future work. This table presents the means and the medians of the delinquency rates of Ohio's small local lenders and of the foreclosure rates in each of Ohio's 88 counties averaged over the 1999-2006 period. The sample is split into four groups. The first split is across the median of the total number of loans originated by all lenders per housing unit, denoted by Loan t-2 , two years before the observed foreclosures, F t , and one year before the observed delinquencies, D t-1 . The statistics from the first split are in Panel A. The second split is across the median market share of different types of lenders within each Loan t-2 category. In Panel B, the sample is split across the median market share of regulated non-local entities. In Panel C, the split is across the median market share of the less-regulated lenders. The significance of the difference of medians is analyzed with a non-parametric test.
Panel A. The Effect of Loan t-2 Levels
Low 
where ∆Loan it-2 is the increase in the total number of loans originated by all lenders per housing unit in each county i from year t -3 to year t -2. ∆RegNL it-2 and ∆LReg it-2 are the change in the market share of regulated-non-local institutions and less-regulated institutions, respectively.
is the predicted change in the delinquency rate of residential real estate mortgages held on the balance sheets of local depository institutions. ∆Χ it-1 is the change in the factors that affect the value of the default option.
The second column repeats the analysis with purchase mortgages and the third column shows the effect of refinancings.
Pseudo R-square refers to the squared-correlation of the observed dependent variable with its predicted value (Windmeijer, 1995) . The first test at the bottom of the table is a test of the hypothesis that the impact of the regulated non-local lenders on foreclosures is statistically equivalent to the impact of the less-regulated lenders. The second test is a test of the null hypothesis that the autocorrelation in the first-differenced errors is zero.
The coefficients are multiplied by 1,000 to improve the exposition. Standard errors are in parentheses.
( Pseudo R-square refers to the squared-correlation of the observed dependent variable with its predicted value (Windmeijer, 1995) . The test at the bottom of the table is a test of the hypothesis that the impact of the regulated non-local lenders on foreclosures is statistically equivalent to the impact of the less-regulated lenders.
The coefficients are multiplied by 1,000 to improve the exposition. Note that in the delinquency regressions, the delinquency variable used, D "t-1" , is from the year (t -1) preceding the year in the column title, t.
Standard errors are in parentheses.
( The delinquency rate of lenders comes from bank and thrift regulatory reports. The share of the county in each lender's total origination portfolio comes from HMDA. 
